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SUMMARY 
I.  Introduction 
EC-Japan  relations,  and  the  problems  they  raise,  must  be  dealt 
with  in  a  more  general  context,  characterized  by  the 
insufficient  integration  of  the  Japanese  economy  into  the  world 
economy,  and  also  by  the  insufficient  depth  of  EC-Japan 
relations  compared  with  each  partner's  respective  relations 
with  the  United  States.  It  is  therefore  in  the  interest  of 
both  parties  to  strengthen  and  diversify  their  relations  in 
order  to  achieve  a  better  equilibrium  in  their  economic  and 
commercial  exchanges,  taking  also  into  account  the  inter-
relationship  between  the  commercial,  industrial,  monetary 
and  financial  aspects. 
To  this  end  it is  vital  that  the  Community  makes  a·global  and 
sustained  effort  (paragraphs  1  to  6). 
II.  Economic  Background 
I I  I  • 
Japan's  external  imbalances  will  continue  to  grow  over  the 
next  few  years  <current  account  surplus  of  $49.3  billion  in 
1985,  and  a  forecast  of  $58  biLlion  for  1986).  The  recent 
appreciation  of  the  Yen  has  been  more  substantial  igainst  the 
dollar  than  against  the  ECU;  its  effects  on  external 
balances  will  Largely  depend  on  the  economic  policies  which 
accompany  it.  The  measures  taken  until  now  to  stimulate 
internal  demand  do  not  seem  Likely  to  have  much  effect  in 
the  short  term.  The  trade  deficit  of  the  Community  with 
Japan  is  deteriorating  when  measured  in  ECU,  forecast  for 
1985  of  around  18  bio  (paragraphs  7  to  10). 
Political  and  Structural  Factors 
Mr.  NAKASONE's  government  has  displayed  courage  and 
imagination.  Nevertheless,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  it 
will  be  able  to  promote  real  structural  reforms  in  Japan  and 
whether,  to  this  end,  it  can  rely  on  a  firm  consensus  of 
Japanese  opinion,  including  that  within  its  own  party  and  the 
business  community. 
Japan's  partners  in  general  must  also  fully  play  their  role 
in  this  process  by  adopting  new  dynamic  cxrsort  and  investment 
strategies  (paragraphs  11  to  14). - 2-
IV.  Basic  Considerations 
• The  maintenan·ce  of  ·a·  ,free·· trade  ·s·yst·e.m  wou:ld  require. that  the 
·Co m  m  u n i t .y  • .s  .r e l at i on s _ w  i  t h  J a p a n  be· .  j  m  p r o v e d  w  h e n e v e r  · ' 
p.ossible,  and  that· th·e:i.r  cooperat.:io·n ·evolve  on  matters'· 
-o f · m  u t u a L  i n t e r e s t  a s  w  e L  L · a s  -.  .o n  ~ i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ·.  p r o b l e m  s -
where  their  views  are  often  close.  The  risk  of  a 
·multilateral  trade  conflict  remains· nonetheless  acute 
(paragraphs  15  to  19). 
V.  Recommendations 
A.  Increased  dialogue  and  cooperation. 
; ) 
i ; ) 
Make  full  use  of  existing  structures  for  discussion 
and  explore  the  possibilities  of  a  new 
mechanism  that  obviates  the  problems  resulting  from 
the  compartmentalisation  of  the  Japanese 
administration. 
Develop  cooperation,  where  necessary  by  the 
c o n c· l u s i o n  o f · a g r e e m  e n t.s , i n  t h e  f i e L  d s  o f  s c i e n c e  a n d 
t e c h n.o l o g y ,  i n d u s t. r i a t- ·  c o  .o p e r a t. i on ,  d e v e l o p m  e n t . a i d ·, 
... ,  e:conomi.c  pol.i.cy,  monetary. coope:r.ati.o.n  (pa-r-ag·raph  20)·. 
-B.·  Opening  up ·Japa.nese-.marke·ts. 
i) 
; ; ) 
; ; ; ) 
i v) 
Follow  UPi  and  if  possible  accelerate,the 
implementation  of  the  Action  Programme. 
Open  disc'i.Jssions  on  particular  products. 
Align  Japanese  standards  and  certification 
procedures  to  international  standards  and  drastic 
simplification  of  procedures. 
Develop  ~urooean  investments  in  Japan 
(paragraph  21). 
In  any  event,  it  will  be  necessary  for  Japan  to 
purs.ue  an  exchange  rate  polic_y  designed  to  balance  its 
external  account,  and  a  stronger  economic 
policy  designed  to  stimulate  domestic  demand  lparagraph  22). 
The  idea  of  an  import  objective,; .e  a  formula  which  makes 
it  possible  to  measure  the  progress" made  in  boosting  total 
imports  of  manufactured  pruducts,remains  valid 
(parc:graph  23). 
. I  . 
.. .. 
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C.  Re-esta_blishing  a  true  balance. of _advantages 
i)  In  the  framework  of  the  GATT,  and  taking  as  a  point 
of  departure  the  Council  Declaration  on  the  imbalance 
of  advantages  <Conclusions  of  19  March  1985),  the 
Community  will  exercise  all  its  rights  and,  in  the 
context  of  the  New  Round,  will  not  be  willing  to 
grant  concessions  as  Long  as  its  imports  remain  low. 
The  possibility  of  reactivating  Article  XXI!I(2) 
will  be  examined. 
ii)  The  conditions  under  which  European  banks  and  other 
financial  institutions  can  carry  out  their  activities 
on  the  Japanese  market  must  be  examined  to  bring  them 
to  the  same  Level  as  those  faced  by  Japanese  banks 
in  Europe. 
iii)  Member  States•  attitudes  with  regard  to  Japanese 
investments  (in  Level  as  well  as  quality)  should  be 
the  subje~t  of  an  exchange  of  views  within  the 
Community  framework  so  as  to  avoid  over-bidding  for 
those  investments. 
iv)  The  surveillance  of  the  export  of  certain  sensiti~e 
Japanese  products  will  be  continued  (paragraph  34). 
D.  Greater  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  Community 
The  Community  must  increase  its  efforts  at  trade  promotion 
and  investment,  and  the  Commission  must  have  the  necessary 
means  of  doing  so  (parag~aph  25). 
E.  Working  Procedure~  and  Methods 
Given  the  diversity  and  complexity  of  the  areas  in  which 
the  reflections  and  discussions  must  be  car·ried  out,  an 
appropriate  structure  should  be  envisaged  for  a  global 
and  sustained  effort  at  a  Community  Level  vis-a-vis  Japan 
(paragraph  26). 20'd 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
eC-JAPAN  RELATIONS 
COMMISSION  COMMUNICATION  TO  THE  COUNCIL 
1.  The  Community's  problem  with  Japan  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  the 
persistent  economic  and  trade  imbalance;  a  sim~Lar phenomenon  marks 
Japan's  relat1ons  with  most  of  1ts  industriati~ed or  industrial1zing 
trading  partners  and  it symptomatic  of  a  deeper-rooted  problem,  which 
is that  the  Japanese  economy  is  not  suff1c1ently  integrated with  the 
broader  international  economy.  The  problem  is also  that their  relations 
are  so  slender.  The  United  States,  the  Community  and  Japan 
are  the  three  leading  economies  of  the  "western"  world,  but  while  the 
Community  and  the  United  States,  and  to  a  lesser  degree  perhaps  the 
United  States  and  Japan,  have  developed  wide  and  diversified  l1nks, 
EC-Japan  relations,  the  third side of  the  triangle,  are  still underdeveloped, 
owing  partly  to  Japan's  reticence  and  partly to  European  neglect. 
2.  Japan  accounts  for  10%  of  world  GNP,  coming  third  in  the  "western" 
world  behind  the  Unite~ States  (with  approximately  30%)  and  the  Twelve 
<approx1mately  21.7%).  · 
Japan  today  is  undoubtedly  a  world  power  and  front~rank1ng industrial, 
scientific  and  technological  growth  centro.  It  is  thus  in  the  intereRts 
of  both  the  Community  and  Japan  to  develop  a  relationship  sound  and  sustained 
enough  to  do  justice to their  respective  positions. 
Japan  already  plays  a  significant  part  in  international discussions of 
trade,  currency,  financial  and  development  issues.  It  should  be  encouraged 
to  as~ume greater  responsibilities  in  these  fields. 
3.  Diversified  relations  with  Japan  on  an  equal  footing  would  offer 
the  Community  a  way  to  try  and  restore  the  balance  on  the  economic  and 
trade  front  within  a  wider  context.  Conversely,  more  balanced  economic 
and  trade  r~lations would  remove  causes  of  friction  and  make  it easier 
to establish  more  comprehensive  and  diversified ties.  The  very 
interrelatedness of  comp,titive strength,  txchange  rates,  development, 
1source:  World  Bank  Atlas  of  1985.  It  does  not  include  figures  for  the 
Soviet  Union  or  other  Eastern  bloc  countries. 
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the  opening  up  of  markets  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  and  services, 
and  the  growing  international  role  of  both  the  yen  and  the  ECU  mean  that 
the  Community  stands  a  better  chance  of  developing  a  harmonious,  balanced 
relationship  with  Japan  along  these  tines. 
In  Japan  itself  a  similar  recognition  prevails  at  the  hi;htst  level, 
as  Prime  Minister  Nakasone's  recent  statements  make  clear.1 
There  is  the  same  interest  in  improving  the  balance  both  of  international 
economic  relat~ons  and  of  the  multilateral  trade  and  payments  system. 
4.  Nevertheless,  in  the  last  few  years  Japan  has  amassed  ever-larger 
current  account  surpluses,  part  of  a  heavily  lopsided pattern at  the 
broader  international  Level.  This  continuing  trend  is  ·giving  rise to  serious 
problems  in the  monetary  and  trade  equilibrium at  world  level.  While 
Japan's  externaL  surplus  is to  some  extent  offset  by  the  United  States 
external deficit.  it also  reftects  Jaoan's  Low  level  of  manufactured 
imports  and  structural bias  towards  manufactured  exoorts.  This  structur~ 
is  characterised by  strong  ties  within each  of  the  large  industrial 
groups  operating  in  the major  sectors of the  economy  and  by  a  high 
degree  of  vertical  integration;  this has  a  strong  impact  on  external  trade 
and  the  domestic  distribution system.  The  strategy pursued  by  Japan  in 
its economicand  commercia.l  relations with  the  rest  of  the world- and  from. 
which  it has  had  the greatest benefit  - is  largely based  on  this structure·  _ 
and  now  threatens  to  ups~t the whole  international  system  of  trade and 
finance,  to  the  detriment  not  only of  Japan's  partners  but  of  Japan  itself~ . 
5.  Against  this  background  t~e  commission  now  submits  to  the  Council 
an  analysis  of  the  situation,  followed  by  a  number  of  recommenda~ions 
aimed  at: 
stepping  up  dialogue  and  cooperation with  Japan  (paragraph  20)~ 
encouraging  Japan  to  open  up  its markets  st1ll  further  and  seeking 
a  genuine  balance  of  advantage  in  trade  <paragraphs  21,  22,  23  and  24l~ 
intensifying  the  Community's  efforts to establish  itself more  strongly 
in  Japan  (paragraph  25). 
6.  Only  if  the  Community  is  prepared  to  exert  itself as  a  Community 
can  it  hope  to  influenct  the  course  of  events  at  an  increasingly  critical 
juncture  not  only  for  EC-Japan  relations  but  1or  the  preservation  of 
In  a  speech  on  21  January  Mr  Nakasone  acknowledged  that  Japan,  with 
its  increasing  strength,  was  expected  to  assume  its  responsibilities 
within  the  intern•tional  community.  It  was  up  to  Japan  as  a  country 
with  internat1onal  aspirations  and  responsibilities  to qffer  a  sincere 
response  to  these  expectations.  On  the  economic  front,  Mr  Nakasone 
pledged  himself  to  take  steps  domestically  as  well  as  internationally 
to  open  up  th~  market  by  establishing  and  implementing  the  Plan  of  Action, 
and  to  encourage  a  shift  in  the  Japanese  economy  towards  greater  relia~ce 
on  domestic  demand.  .. - 3  -
the  post-war  multilateral  conaensu1  on  int~rnational economic  and  trade 
r8lat1on&. 
II,  ECONOMIC  BACKGROUND 
?.  ever  since  Japan  emerged  as  a  power  in  international  trade  its growth 
has  been  lar~ely export-Led,  Leading  to  the  build  up  over  the  years  of 
surpluses  on  the  external  account. 
t'0'd 
The  surpluses  are  expected  to  go  on  1ncreas1ng  for  the  next  two  years. 
The  Latest  OECD  forecasts  point  to  an  increase  in  the  overall  current 
account  surplus  from  the  $35  billion  reached  in  1984  to  $45  billion  1n 
1985~ $58  billion 1n  1986  and  over  $62  b1Ll1on  in  198?,  paralleled  by 
the  growth  of  the  trade  surplus. 
Pursuant  to  the  decisions  taken  by  the  Group  o1  5  on  23  September  the 
Bank  of  Japan  intervened decisively,  along  with  other  central  banks, 
to  push  the  yen  up  by  some  20%  against  the dollar.  In  the  long  term 
a  stronger  yen  should  help  bring  down  the trade  and  current  account  9urpluses 
<though  the  short-term effect  could  be  just  the  reverse) ..  In  the  last 
analysis,  however,  the  1mpact  on  external  balances  of  an  appreciating 
currency de~ends on  the  economic  policies  wh1ch  accompany  it.  It should 
aleo  be  borne  in  mind  that the yen  has  ga1ned  mainly  against  the  dollar; 
its appreciation against  European  currencies  has  been  modest  <up  3%  against 
the  ECU). 
8.  Japan's  current  account  surplus  is  partly due  to a structural  imbalance 
between  domestic  savings  and  investment.  The  huge  savings  surplus  reflects 
weak  domestic  demand,  caused  in  turn by  the  slugg1sh  growth  of  household 
consumption,  housing  investment  and  public  spending  on  social  infrastructure, 
and  by  Japan's  tax  structure. 
The  measures  announced  by  Tokyo  1n  October  and  Late  December  to stimulate 
domestic  demand  will  have  only a  marginal  effect  on  the  external 
imbalances;  the  official government  forecast  is that the  October  measures 
will  boost  total  imports  <no  doubt  including  raw  materials  and 
sem1-manufactures  es  well  as  manufactured  goods)  by  $2  billion  in  1986; 
Japanese  private-sector  institutes,  however,  put  the  figure  at  Less  than 
$1  billion.  No  figures  have  been  advanced  for  the  December  measures. 
The  prospects  for  a  real  import  stimulus  look  poor  1n  the  short  term. 
9.  The  three  year  Plan  of  Action  to open  up  the  Japanese  market  1s  a 
step  in  the  right  direction,  but  for  the  time  being  the  effects are  not 
certain.  The  Japanese  authorities  say  they  are  not  in  a  position to 
1  . 
S1nce  then  the  actual  figures  show~ surplus of  $49.3  billion. 
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guage  its impact  in  terms  of  actual  increases  in  the  volume  of  imports, 
and  add  that  no  measurable  effect  on  trade  is  to be  expected  in  the ensuing 
twelve  months.1  Despite  the  intention of  the  Japanese  authorities 
to speed  up  implementation  of  the programme,  the  judgment  of  the 
Council  on  22  October  that  the  practical  effects  were  likely to  be 
limited,  and  in  any  case  slow  to  make  themselves  felt,  remains  valid, 
10.  The  Community's  structural  trade  deficit with  Japan  has  continued  to  rise  in 
ecu  terms,growing  from  14  billion  ECU  in  1983  to  16.5  billion  ECU  in 
1984  and  an  estimated  18  billion ecu  in  1985,  0.32~ of  Community  GOP. 
There  has  also been  a  qualitative deterioration,  1.e.  a  decline  in 
the  value-added  Level  of  Community  exports.  The  gap  could  widen  still 
further  if Japan  were  to  resume  a  more  aggressive  stance  on  the  European 
market,  as  a  result of  a  slowdown  in  US  demand  or  the  more  marked  rise 
in  the  yen  against  the  dollar  compared  to  its appreciation  against 
European  currencies. 
III.  POLITICAL  AND  STRUCTURAL  FACTORS 
11.  Prime  Minister  Nakasone  personally,  and  oth~r members  of  the 
Japanese  Government,  have  displaytd  courage  and  imagination.  Recent 
measures  and  procedures  set  in  train are  undoubtedly  mo~es 1n  the  right 
direction,  and  should  be  welcomed  unreservedly  as  auch.  A Study  Group 
on  Structural  Economic  Adjustment  for  International  Cooperation,  chaired 
by  a  former  governor  of  the  Bank  of  Japan,  1s  due  to  report  to  the 
Prime  Minister  in  March  with  recommendations  on  domestic  structural 
changes  which  would  help  reduce  the  chronic  trade  and  payments  surpluses. 
So  the  need  for  structural  change  is  acknowledged  in  principle. 
12.  However,  there  is  also  1n  Japan  - inter alia  in  the  industrial 
and  business  community  - a  body  of  opinion  e1ther  opposed  to change, 
or  simply  tending  to  inertia or  complacency.  The  roots  of  the  problem 
within  the  system  itself are  not  yet  widely  recognized,  still  less 
openly  admitted  by  government  and  administration.  There  are still 
those  in  Tokyo  who  believe it will  be  enough  for  Japan  to  cut  down 
visible barriers  to  trade  and  exhort  businessmen  to  buy  more  foreign 
goods,  They  see  no  need  for  domestic  policy  and  structural  changes;  it 
is  up  tothe~overseas exporter.  to  make  the  effort  to increase  sales 
to  what,  in  their  view,  is the  "free"  Japanese  market.  Japan  can  pride 
itself on  having  the  "most  open  market  in  the  world"  - never  mind  about 
1However,  the  MITt  Minister  has  just  announced  that  he  has  succeeded 
2 
in  persuading  134  top  Japanese  companies  to  increase  their overseas 
purchases  by  a  total  of  $7.4  billion  1n  1986  <as  compared  to  total 
purchases  abroad  by  the  same  companies  in  excess  of  $103  billion in  1985). 
Following  an  agreement  reached  in  the  International  Energy  Agency  in  July  1985, 
the  Diet  has  adopted  in 1985  a  bill authorizing the  importation of  certain 
refined  petroleum  products  into Japan  for  the  first  time. - 5 -
the  actual  volume  of  imports.  Others  see  a  reduction  of  the  surplus  with 
the  United  States  as  the  only  real  necessity. 
13.  Clearly  there  are  Limits  to  the ability of  Japan's  politicians 
to  fulfH  the  expectations  of  international opinion  unless  they  can 
rely  on  a  sound,  broadly"based national  consensus  reaching  beyond  government 
and  adm1nietration  to  take  in  the  parties,  the  main  i~dustrial snd 
financial  groups  and  public  opinion  as  a  whole.  So  far  it cannot  be 
said with  certainty that  a  firm  consensus  of  this  nature  exists.  The 
uncertainty  is  further  highlighted  by  the  possibility of  change  in 
the  country's  overall  polittcal direction  before  the  end  of  this  year; 
a  retreat  to  mor~  ins~Lar, even  nationalisttc, attitudes  cannot  wholly 
be  ruled out. 
14.  So  far  the  Japanese  government  has  not  been  willing to  set  a  quantified 
import  target  or  "vision"  to  serve  as  a  yardstick  by  which  to  measure 
the  sort  of  import  growth  needed  for  the  balance  and  stability of  the 
international  trading  system.  Vet  similar  suggestions  have  been  made 
within  Japan  itself  Cby  a  former  minister,  Saburo  Okita,  and  some  members 
of  the  study  Group  on  Structural  Adjustments  among  others>;  there 
is  confirmation  that  recent  trade  strateg1ea  have  made  use  of  indicative 
targets  for  national  economic  planning,  as  well  as  IKport  "visions", 
and  it seems  Likely  that  the  administration  would  need  firm  guidelines 
to  implement  the  programmes  or  procedural  changes  already  announced 
or  under  consideration,  which  contain  no  quantified estimates. 
Again,  statements  by  the  Japanese  authorities  plainly  acknowledge  the 
need  for  concrete  results.  Having  said that, however,  there  is  always 
the  familiar  suspicion  that  Japan's  trading  partners  will  be  offered 
procedural  rather  than  substantive  measures,  policy  statements  rather 
than  the  prospect  of  real  improvements. 
IV.  BASIC  CONSIO~RATIONS 
• 
15.  Maintenance  of  a  Liberal  system  of  world  trade  requires  an  improvement 
in  the  Community's  relations with  Japsn  wherever  possible.  Japan  must 
become  a  partner  in  monetary  and  financial  affairs as  well.  It  is 
hardly  acceptable  that  Japan,  as  the  world's  third  Largest  economy, 
and  the  Community,  with  a  population  of  320  m1llion,  representing  over 
a  fifth  of  total  world  production,  should  continue  to  be  separated 
by  trade,  industr1al  and  financial  conflicts  and  not  cooperate  more 
closely  on  most  international  economic  problems. 
16~omprehensive, diversif1ed  cooperation  between  the  two  sides  is  needed 
90'd 
in  order  to  find  ways  of  achieving  more  harmonious  world  economic  growth, 
establishing a  more  stable  and  predictable  1nternat16nal  monetary  system, 
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and  preserving  and  strengthening the  multilateral  trading  system. 
This  bilateral  relationship would  form  part  of  the  wider  cooperation 
between  the  thrte main  "western"  economic  powers,  the  United  States, 
the  EEC  and  Japan;  in  other  wordm,  relations  between  the  two  last-nemed 
powers  must  become  as  strong  and  sustained as  those  which  each  of  them 
enjoys  with  the  United  States. 
To  this  end  Japan  and  the  Community  need  to  coordinate  their economic 
policies  more  ~ffectively.  They  should  collaborate  1n  developing  the 
international  role  of  tho  yen  and  the  ECU  aa  payment  and  reserve 
currencies.  If the  multilateral  trading  system  is to  be  preserved 
and  strengthened,  Japan  must  take  effective  steps  to  bring  its bilateral 
surpluses  under  control,  and  that  means  paying  more  attention  to the 
yen's  rate against  European  currtnc1ta.  Clearly,  too,  closer economic 
links  would  be  helped  by  greater  two-way  penetration  in  tho  form  of 
investment  projects or  eKchan;e  of  technology,  given  a  propitious 
environment. 
Cooperation  is  also needed  in the  search  for  solutions to  international 
problems  of  mutuaL  concern,  such  as  development  aid,  on  which  Japan 
and  the  Community  often  in  fact  have  rather  similar  views. 
17.  It is the  Commission's  belief  that  such  cooperation  with  Japan 
is  in  the  interests of  the  Community. 
As  far  as  Japan,  generally  more  rtticent,  is  concerned,  there  has  been 
evidence  Lately  of  a  change  in  attitude at  the  top.  In  his  speech 
on  21  January  the  Prime  Minister  said he  intended  to seek  cooperation 
at  a  higher  level,  and  wanted  to  find  ways  of  cooperating  more 
fruitfully with  the  Community. 
18.  The  Community  should  therefore  go  on  encouraging  Japan  in  its 
efforts  to  integrate  itself more  fully  in  the  multilateral  trade  and 
payments  system,  and  should  develop  cooperation  with  Japan  wherever 
it usefully  can  in  order  to achieve  a  better overall  balance  of 
relations. 
19.  The  risk of  trade  conflicts,  multilateral  rather  than  bilateral, 
perhaps,  may  remain  acute  for  some  time,  however,  and  could.  indeed 
increase  over  the  next  two  years.  Despite  its huge  surpluses,  high 
growth  rates,  low  unemployment  and  inflation and  powerful  manufacturing 
and  technological  base,  Japan  is still not  playing  an  1nternat1onal 
role  commensurate  with  its economic  weight.  The  aen1e  of  responsibility 
and  strong  leadership  evinced  by  tht prtstnt  government  in  Tokyo  have 
not  done  away  with  the  multilateral  structural  imbalance  which 
threatens  the  foundat~ons of  post-war  cooperation  and  represents  a 
veritable  time-bomb  within  the  trading  system. - 7-
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In  the  light  of  what  has  been  said abov1,  the  Commission  puts 
the  following  recommendations. 
A.  Increased  dialogu~d cooperation 
forward 
20.  The  Community  must  create  closer  relations  w1th  Japan  and  broaden  the 
scope  of  these  relations. 
<  i>  DiaLogue 
(a}  The  Commiss1on  plans  to put  the  tKisting  framework  and  mechanisms 
on  a  permanent  footing,  namely: 
•  the  annual  ministerial  conference; 
•  the  high-level  conaultat1ons  <senior  officials),  also  annual; 
•  meetings  and  consultations between  officials on  specific  or 
sectoral  aspects  of  trade  relations,  cooperation  on  financial 
and  monetary  matters  and  on  technical  standards; 
(b)  In  order  to obviate  the  problems  resulting  tram  the  compartmentalization 
of  the  Japanese  administration,  the  Commission  has  also proposed 
to  the  Japanese  authorities  that  a  "monitoring  group"  be 
created,  made  up  of  personal  representatives  of  the  Japanese 
Prime  Minister  and  the  President  o1  the  Commission,  whose  remit 
would  extend  over  the  various  ministries  and  wh1ch  would  be 
responsible  for  monitoring  progress  in  relations,  evaluating 
this  progress  and  recommending  appropriate action. 
The  aim  of  this proposal,  the details of  which  have  to  be  finalized 
in  consultation  with  the  Japanese  authorities,  is  to  introduce 
a  new  approach  to  the  problems  and  should  in  no  way  lead  to  any 
form  of  procedural  side-tracking. 
<iO  Cooperation 
The  Commission  intends  promoting  active  cooperation  with  Japan  1n 
the  fields  of  science  and  technology,  focusing  on  thermonuclear 
fusion  (consultations  are  already  well  under  way  here),.biotechnology, 
new  materials  and  exchanges  of  young  researchers. 
Industrial  cooperation  should  also be  sttpped  up  by  actively 
encouraging  a  greeter  two-way  flow  of  investments  and  industrial 
technology.  In  this  context,  it  is  worth  studying  closely Japan's 
proposal  to  set  up  a  cooperation  centre  in  Tokyo.  This  proposal 
should  not,  however,  be  follo~ed up  unless  it meets  the  real  needs 
of  European  industry;  assoe1ations  representing  industry  are 
currently being  con!Julted  by  the  Commhs1on. ( i i i) 
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Development  assistance  is another area  where  cooperation  should  be 
stepped  up  beyond  the  present  minimum.  An  active  coordination with 
Japan  should  be  undertaken,  particularly  in  the  framework  of  priority 
action  contemplated  by  the  Community  for  the  protection of  natural 
resources  and  for  the  fight  against  desertification which  calls  for 
improved  coordination  with  donor  countries;  in the  short  term  this 
could  aim  at  specific  actions  which  fall  within  the  scope  of  the 
Programme  for  rehabilitation and  relief  in  favour  of  the  countries 
most  affected  b~.~ro~~ht being  implemented  by  the  Commission. 
Finall~, since  both  parti~s_have a  clear  interest  in  seeing  a  more 
stablejand better balanced monetary  system  set  up,  the  possibility 
of  mon  tary  cooperation  between  Japan  and  the  Community  should 
be  actively  looked  into, one  example  being  the  exchange  rate 
betwee  the. Yen  and  the  ECU. 
F1nalll',  since  the  Community  increasingly needs  to  speak  with  a 
voice  n  the  problems  of  North-South  relations  (including  the 
indebt  dness  of  the  developing  countries)  particularly at 
wester  economic  summits,  it would  also  be  logical  to  have  more 
dialog  e  with  Japan  on  these  issues. 
uj Japanese  ma,keta 
single 
21.  The  Commission  also plans  keeping  pressure  on  the  Japanese  authorities 
as  regards  th
1e  problem  of  access  to  the  Japanese  market. 
<il  The  co.lission will  be  following  closely  the  implementation  of 
the  thr,~e-year action  programme  and  will  be  having  consultations 
with  the  Japanese  authorities  on  this.  The  aim  is to  ensure  the 
full,  precise  and  speedy  implementation  of  the  programme. 
I 
( i i) 
(; i 1) 
I 
·rhe  Com~ission believes  it would  be  useful  to start talks  on 
particullar  products,  with  the  aim  of  seeking  the  rapid  abolition 
of  obst~cles not  covered  by  the  action  programme.  The  sectors of 
I.  alcoholic beverages  and  possibly  of  medical  equipment  could  in this 
connection  strve  as  a  test·of the  political will  of  the  Japanese 
Government  to open  effectively its market  to all  GATT  trading partners. 
~he results of  these  ~al~s would  be  examined  by  the  Council  after 
12  months.  · 
'  I 
Japanes~ standards  and  certification procedures 
i 
Japanes~·  standards  and  certification procedures  differ  from 
the  gen  rally  more  liberal  ones  of  its main  trading  partners;  they 
have  pr  sented  formidable  non-tariff barriers  to trade  in 
respect  of  highly  competitive  exports  from  the  Community.  The 
Community  must  maintain  pressure  on  Japan  to  align  its standards ! 
'' 
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en  internat~~~sl practice and  gr&atly  s1mpl1fy  its cert111cat1on  procedures. 
In  the  parti~uler  c~se of  chemicals  and  pharmaceutical  products,  the 
n~got1ation  ~f  a~ agreement  between  tht Commun1ty  and  Japan  recognizing  good 
labor1tory  p1ootice  in  the  Community  would  get  rid  of  a  major  ob&taelt 
to  our  expor~s in  these  sectora. 
<iv)  Euro  ean  nvestments  in  Ja  an 
One  of  thf  cond1t1ons  for  greater  interthange  between  the  economies 
of  the  Co  mun1ty  and  Japan  is  a  higher  Level  of  European  investment 
in  Japan.  This  objective cannot  be  attained  ~ithout,  among  other 
things,  1 proving  the  environment  for  foreign  investment'  in  Japan  as  regards 
modalities  of  taking  over  Japanese  companies,  facilitation of 
joint venlures.  For  this  to  be  possible,  European  investors 
~ill need  an  adequate  network  of  European  services  (banks,  insurance, 
Legal  con  ultants). 
22.  Whatever  lthe  case,  a  real  opening  up  of  Japanese  markets  and  a  real 
. increase  in  Japanese  imports  will  depend  on  fulfilment  of  the  following 
conditions: l 
- that  Japan  pursues  an  exchange  rate  policy  designed  to  balance  its 
external  a  count;  this •ntails,  among  other  things,  adjustments  1n 
the  Yen·EC.  and  Yen-dollar  exchange  rates; 
- that  Japanilpursues  economic  policies designed  to  stimulate  domestic 
demand  eve  more  vigorously  so  that  the  full  effect of  exchange  rate 
adjustment  will  be  felt;only  a  vigorous  policy of  support  for 
domestic  d  mand,  going  beyond  the measures  announced  in  October  and 
December  1  85  can  help  put  world  trading  accounts  in  more  satisfactory 
shape·  !  .  ,  I 
that  the  J 
restrictio 
the  key  c 
balance  be 
standards 
investment 
o1  Japanes 
panese  Government,  even  taking  into  account  1ts  budgetary 
s,  take  more  energetic  action  to  promote  domestic  demand; 
mponents  of  such  a  policy  would  be  to  bring  about  a  better 
ween  the  level  of  savings  end  that  of  investment,  higher 
f  living and  housing,  a  substential  increase  in  public 
in  social  infra1tructure and  a  continuing  liberalization 
finencial  markets. 
23.  The  Comm  n1ty  must  make  it  known  that  it still wants  the  Japanese 
Government  t  set  precise  import  targets or,  if this  is not  possible, 
give  estimat  s  and  its forecast  for  imports  of  manufactured  products, 
in short  a  formula  which  makes  it possible  to measure  the  progress 
m~de in  boos~ing total  imports  of  manufactured  and  processed  agricultural 
products.  1 
Clearly,  by  ~hue giving  itself a  sort  of  "national priority",  so 
concentratin  minds  and  mobilizing  energies,  the  Japanese  Governmentwould 
provide  itself with  the  basis  for  a  goal-oriented policy.  The 
essential  th1ng,  as  the  Japanese  authorities  themselves  recognize,  is 
to  get  tang1~Le results  showing  a  reversal  of  trends. 
i 
i 
C.  R.e-estab l j  sh i ng  a  true  balance  of  advantage 
24.  The  c~mm~nity has  to  try  to  put  its economic  and  trade  relations 
with  Japan  o~ a  more  balanced  footing. - 10  -
(1)  GATT  .......... 
In  the  co~text of  the  preparations  for  the  New  Round  of  trade 
negot1at19ns  under  GATT,  the  Council  noted  on  19  March  1985  that 
there  was·an  imbalance  in  the  advantages  obtained  by  Japan  and  its 
main  trading partners. 
The  Commu 
it under 
practices 
level  of 
force  of 
1ty  must  naturally exercise all  the  rights  available  to 
ATT  in  its various  trade disputes with  Japan.  Unfair 
(dumping,  etc.)  by  a  partner of  Japan•s  importance  and 
ndustrial development  must  be  penalized with  the  full 
ommunity  legislation,  in accordance  with  GATT. 
As  regard  the  New  Round,  the  Community  cannot  allow  a  repetition 
of  what  h ppened  in  the  past,  when  similar concessions  did  not  Lead 
to  corres  onding  results.  Therefore,  the  Community  will  not  be 
willing  t  grant  concessions  of  substantial benefit  to  Japan  as  Long 
as  its  im  orts  remain  low.  The  Commission  proposes  to  report  to 
the  Counc  l  in  coming  months  on  whether  it is necessary  to  refer 
the  matte  of  unullified or  impaired"  concessions  to  the 
Contracti.g Parties  to  GATT  under  Article  XX111(2)  for  consideration 
by  a GATT!working  part~, either in  the  fr~mework of  the  New  Round 
or  in  par~llel. 
<ii) Japanese  banks  and  other financial  institutions  have  steadily increased 
their activities on  the  Community  market,  thereby  reinforcing  the 
Japanese  commercial  effort  in  the  Community.  But  the  conditions  under 
which  European  banks  are  required  to operate  in  Japan1  do  not  reflect 
the  Liberal  conditions  of  establishment  and  operation  enjoyed  by 
Japanese  banks  in  European  financial  markets.  There  is  in fact  little 
evidence  of  any  change  being  instituted in  the  matter  by  the  Japanese 
authorities despite  repeated  demands  made  by  the  Commission  over  the 
years.  This  has  created an  imbalance  similar to  that  which  has  existed 
for  a  Long  time  in trade  in goods  and  which  is out-of-place  in  relations 
between  two  of  the  world's  Largest  trading  partners.  Whilst  efforts 
which  have  so  far  been  made  on  the national  level  to  remedy  this 
situation are  wholly  understandable,  the  degree  of  common  interest and 
the  link  with  Community  trade  and  investments  in  Japan  make  it 
indispensable  to  ensure  a  Community  approach  to  Japan  in this sector. 
The  Commission  therefore  intends  to  pursue  discussions  with  Member 
States  as  a  matter  of  urgency  in order  to  identify precisely the 
difficulties encountered on  the  Japanese  market,  and  to  define  our 
Gommon  objectives  and  the  way  in which  these  can  be  achieved  in 
negotiations  with  the  Japanese  authorities.  It will  submit  proposals 
to  the  Council  (Eco  Fin). 
Over  the  Last
1 twenty  years,  less  than  1%  of  all deposits  and  some  3.5X 
of  all  loans  ~nd discounts  in  Japan  have  been  accounted  for  by  foreign 
b~nks, with  n~ improvement  in  the  posit1on  despite  the  rise  in  the 
number  of  brahches  and  offices.  The  Levels  achieved  by  Japanese  banks 
1n  Europe,  while  varying  from  country  to  country,  are  clearly  much 
higher. - 11  -
(iii)  Quantity  and  quality of  Japanese  1nvestmenta  in  Europe 
At  present,  only  a  fifth of  Japan&se  investments  in  the  Community 
arc  for  manufacturing or  assembly,  and  of  this  only  a  fraction 
involves  a  significant  amount  of  value  added  locally.  The 
remaining  investments  are  directly  linked  to  Japanese  companies' 
export  and  trade  thrust  and  the  financial  sector.  In  order  to 
attract  as  much  investment  as  possible  in  manufacturing,  national 
and  regional  authorities  1n  Europe  have  often been  led  into 
competition with  each  other,  each  offering bigger  or  more 
advantageous  subsidies  and  other  ~ncentives.  An  exchange  of  views 
between  the  Member  States at  Community  level  would  thus  seem 
necessary  to  counteract  the  tend~ncy of  Japanese  investors  to 
exploit  these  attempts  at  outbidding.  Japanese  investments 
should  be  steered  towards  manufacturing  •ctiv1t1es  with  a  high 
value  added  so  that  Japanese  interests become  ~nextricebly  Linked 
with  a  market  of  320  million  consumers,  which  already  buys  more 
than  20  billion dollars worth  of  their f1n1shed  products  annually 
and  is  Japan•s  second  largest  market.  Furthermore  attention should 
be  given  to  preventing  investments  Limited  to assembly  operations 
in  Europe  of  imported  "components"  being  effected  for  the  purpose 
of  circumventing  existing anti-dumping  measures. 
(1V)  Surveillance of  Japanese  exports 
The  basic  principle of  community  policy  is still to  find  a  balance 
through  an  increase  in  Japane~e imports  of  manufactured  goods  rather 
than  restrictions  on  its exports.  However,  problems  still remain 
es  regards  11 Laser  beam 11  Japaneu  exports  in  certain well-defined 
sectors. 
With  the  expir~ of  the  arrangement  on  the  moderation  of  Japanese  exports 
of  certain  sensitive  products,  the  Commission  will  continue  its close 
surveille7ce  of  imports  of  these  products  from  Japan.  It will  call  for - 12  -
consultations  should  problema  arise  in  these  sectors.  The  Japanese 
author1t1~s have  for  their part  indicated that  they  have  started surveillance 
of  a  number  of  prod~etss  colour  televisions  and  tubes,  numer1c$lly  controlled 
Lathes  and  mach1n1ng  centres,  cera  1nd  light  commercial  vehicles,  li1t 
trucks  and  video  recorders. 
D.  Greater  efforts on  the eart of  the  Community 
25.  The  Community  itself must  also multiply its efforts. 
(i)  The  Community  must  increase  tradt promotion  on  the  Japanese  market. 
The  Commission  will  present  proposals  to this end  under  the  1987  budget, 
proposa~ including  stepping  up  Communities  activities to promote  exports 
and  investment,  putting emphasis  on  Language  training  and  back-up  for 
firms,  particularly  small  and  medium-sized  undtrtakings  which  do  not 
have  a  foothold  on  the  Japanese  marktt.  The  aim  will  be  to double 
these  activities over  the  next  two  years. 
There  must  also  be  mort  information  for  European  business  circles on 
industrial  and  technological  trends  Cand  especially a  greater effort 
to collect  and  translate this  information>  and  on  opportunities  on 
the Japanese  market. 
Cii)  Given  that  dossiers  have  to  be  prepared  in  great detail  end  that 
all aspects  of  relations with  Japan  are  very  "labour·intensive",  the 
Commission  must  have  the  proper  resources. 
In  addition  to  calling on  e~per~s from  national  administrations  on 
temporary  secondment,  it will  also  seek  pro~ressiveli to  equip  itself 
with  a  body  of  young  officials 'with  specialist  knowledge  of  Japan. 
The  Commission  wishes  to  increase staff  levels  both  in Brussels 
and  in  Tokyo  and  will  present  prQposals  to enable  it to 
do  so  in  the  framework  of  the  next  budget. 
E.  Work1ni  procedures  and  methods 
~6.  A.suitable structure  for  coordinated  talks  is also  needed. 
It is  clear that  reflections  and  discussions  on  subjects  such  as  the 
search  for  a  better balance  of  advantages  in the  sphere  of  banking  and 
financial  activities  (see  point  24  above)  or  telecommunications 
illustrate the  fact  that  trade  policy discussions  cover~ more  and  more 
diversified field.  Even  in  national  administrationsthese areas 
are  dealt  with  by  different  departments.  The  structure  for  discussion 
in  the  Council  should  therefore  reflect  the  complexity  of  the  areas 
covered  and  satisfy the  need  for  a  global  and  sustained effort at 
Community  level vis-a-vis  Japan. 